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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
WILFRED A. VIGIL, JR., : Case No. 900166 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
The issue presented in the State7s petition for rehearing 
is whether this Court properly concluded that "the crime of 
attempted depraved indifference homicide does not exist in Utah." 
State v. Viail. Case No. 900166, slip op. at 9 (Utah September 3, 
1992) . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Statement of the Case contained in the State's 
petition for rehearing sets forth the posture of this case. A copy 
of the opinion issued by this Court in State v. Viail. Case No. 
900166 (Utah September 3, 1992) is contained in Addendum A. 
In a Minute Entry dated September 24, 1992, this Court 
requested that Defendant/Appellant Wilfred Vigil respond to the 
State's petition. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
As this Court recognized in its opinion, "the facts are 
unimportant to the issue" raised in this case. Viail. slip op. 
at 1. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This Court correctly decided that attempted depraved 
indifference homicide is not a crime in Utah, based on the language 
of the relevant statutes, the Model Penal Code (MPC) and Utah case 
law. Case law from other jurisdictions and the logical 
impossibility of such a crime also demonstrate the correctness of 
this Court's decision. 
The State's petition for rehearing blurs the distinction 
between the "knowing" mental state proscribed in Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 76-5-202 and 76-5-203(1)(a) and the "depraved indifference" 
mental state of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(1)(c). These are two 
distinct mental states, the former of which requires that the actor 
know that death is the inevitable consequence of his actions whereas 
depraved indifference requires only that the actor know he created a 
grave risk of death. 
While the MPC arguably supports a determination that 
attempt can exist where an actor has knowledge that his conduct will 
cause a death as proscribed by Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(1)(a), the 
MPC suggests that an actor cannot commit an attempt where he only 
has knowledge that his conduct has created a grave risk of death. 
Furthermore, despite the suggestion in the MPC that attempted 
homicide might be a crime where the actor had knowledge his conduct 
would cause a death, only a minority of jurisdictions has adopted 
this interpretation. The State's request that this Court give an 
expansive meaning to the term "intent" in Utah Code Ann. 
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§ 76-4-101(2) is not supported by the language of the statute, rules 
of statutory construction or case law from this Court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT. THIS COURT FOLLOWED THE RELEVANT STATUTES 
AND EXISTING CASE LAW IN REACHING ITS DECISION 
THAT ATTEMPTED DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE HOMICIDE IS 
NOT A CRIME. 
In a carefully reasoned decision based on accepted rules 
of statutory construction, Utah case law and the Model Penal Code, 
this Court correctly held that attempted depraved indifference 
homicide is not a crime in Utah. Vigil, slip op. at 9. 
In analyzing Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(1) (the second 
degree murder statute) and Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101 (the attempt 
statute), this Court looked first to the plain language of the 
statutes, then properly applied the following two rules of statutory 
construction: (1) "specific statutory provisions take precedence 
over general statutory provisions. E.g.. Osuala v. Aetna Life & 
Casualty. 608 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah 1980)"; and (2) "statutory 
provisions should be construed to give full effect to all their 
terms. E.g.. Shurtz fv. BMW of N.Am.. Inc.]. 814 P.2d [1108] at 
1112 [(Utah 1991)]." Vigil, slip op. at 4. 
This Court also recognized that the State's position in 
this case is inconsistent with this Court's prior decisions in 
State v. Bell. 785 P.2d 390 (Utah 1989), State v. Norman. 580 P.2d 
237 (Utah 1978), and State v. Howell. 649 P.2d 91 (Utah 1982). In 
Bell, this Court stated that to be guilty of an attempt, one must 
- 3 -
intend to consummate the underlying crime, and that to be guilty of 
an attempted murder, one must intend to kill. Bell, 785 P.2d at 
394. This Court also stated in Bell; 
Indeed, in the face of logic, it is inescapable 
that the crime of attempted murder requires 
proof of intent to kill. 
Id. In oral argument in this case, the State acknowledged that 
these cases require an intent to kill, but asked this Court to give 
the term "intent to kill" an expansive interpretation which is not 
supported by the language of the statute or prior case law. 
In its petition for rehearing, the State raises 
essentially the identical argument that is presented to the Court on 
direct appeal. First, the State quotes a passage from the Model 
Penal Code that it quoted in its appellate brief, claiming again 
that such passage supports its argument that the Model Penal Code 
envisioned a crime of attempted depraved indifference homicide. 
State's petition for rehearing at 4-5. 
As Mr. Vigil pointed out in his reply brief at 2-3, the 
quoted passage refers specifically to Section 5.01(b) of the MPC. 
The language of 1(b) was not adopted in Utah. Furthermore, that 
section refers to situations where the actor has the purpose of 
causing a specific result or the belief that his conduct will cause 
a specific result. By contrast, depraved indifference requires only 
a knowledge by the actor that he or she has created a grave risk of 
death, not that death will be the inevitable consequence of his 
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actions. See State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1984).1 
Although there is a fine line between these two concepts, they 
nevertheless are distinct mental states. 
The quoted passage refers to a hypothetical situation in 
which the actor intends to demolish a building by detonating a bomb 
"knowing that persons were in the building and they would be killed 
by the explosion." 1 Amer. L. Inst., Model Penal Code and 
Commentaries, 304-5 (1985) (emphasis added). This type of knowing 
mental state is distinguishable from depraved indifference since the 
death of the occupants is the inevitable consequence of the 
actions. In a depraved indifference scenario, although a grave risk 
of death is created, death is not the inevitable consequence.2 
In addition to the portion of the MPC quoted by the 
State, the MPC also states: 
[A]n actor commits an attempt when he does or 
omits to do anything with the purpose of 
causing "or with belief that it will cause" 
1. In Fontana, 680 P.2d at 1046, this Court arrived at the 
requisite mental state for depraved indifference by default, after 
rejecting both "intentionally" and "recklessly" as possible mental 
states. However, the knowledge required for depraved indifference 
is "knowledge that his conduct created a grave risk of death to 
another." Id. at 1047. This contrasts with knowledge that the 
conduct will cause death, as proscribed by subsection 1(a) of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-203. 
2. In a situation where the actor knows his conduct will cause a 
death, a charge under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(1)(a) rather than 
§ 76-5-203(1)(c) is appropriate. While a person who detonates a 
building knowing that people are inside could be charged 
alternatively with depraved indifference homicide when the people 
die, the scenario described in the MPC comment involves knowledge 
that the people will die and not the depraved indifference scenario 
where there is only a grave risk they will die. 
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such result without further conduct on his 
part. Thus, a belief that death will ensue 
from the actor's conduct . . . will suffice, as 
well as a purpose to bring about the results. 
MPC, art. 5, § 501. 
Although the comment suggests that an attempt might exist 
where the actor knew that his conduct would result in death, "folnly 
a minority of recent decisions have explicitly followed the Model 
Penal Code on this point." State's appellate brief at 9, citing MPC 
at 305 (emphasis added). Furthermore, the issue before this Court 
is not whether one who acts with knowledge that his conduct will 
result in death can commit an attempted homicide. The issue is 
whether one can be guilty of an attempt where he acts with depraved 
indifference, a distinct mental state from knowing that conduct will 
cause death. 
In relying on the quoted passage, the State fails to 
consider the remainder of the same comment. Immediately prior to 
the quoted passage, the comment points out that where an actor 
engages in conduct which recklessly or negligently creates a risk of 
death, ,f[t]he approach of the Model Penal Code is not to treat such 
behavior as an attempt." Id. at 304. More importantly, immediately 
after the passage quoted by the State, the comment states: 
Since a particular crime must actually be 
intended, the charge must be precise and must 
not permit the jury to convict the actor on one 
of several mental states. Thus when the charge 
is attempted murder or assault with intent to 
kill, it is error to permit conviction on a 
finding of reckless disregard for human life 
(footnote omitted) or intent to inflict 
grievous bodily harm (footnote omitted). And 
since a conviction for murder can be premised 
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on either of these mental states—as well as on 
intent to kill—it is improper to say that one 
can be convicted of attempted murder if he 
could have been convicted of murder had the 
victim died. There must be a specific intent 
to kill. 
Id. at 306-7 (emphasis added). 
The comment, read as a whole, indicates that attempted 
depraved indifference homicide was not a crime envisioned by the 
MPC. In its opinion, this Court correctly recognized that the MPC 
did not envision a crime of attempted depraved indifference 
homicide. Vigil, slip op. at 6. 
The State's argument in its petition for rehearing blurs 
the concepts of knowing that conduct will cause death and depraved 
indifference. First degree murder under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202 
requires that the actor intentionally or knowingly cause the death 
of another. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(1)(a) defines second degree 
murder as intentionally or knowingly causing the death of another. 
The knowing mental state in each of these subsections requires that 
the actor be "aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause 
the result." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103. In other words, for one to 
act with such a knowing mental state, he must be aware that death is 
the inevitable consequence of his actions. 
The issue before the Court in the present case is not 
whether an attempt exists where the actor knew that his conduct 
would result in a death. Instead, the issue is whether an attempt 
can exist where the actor knew that he created a grave risk of death 
to another. In analyzing the MPC and State v. Maestas, 652 P.2d 903 
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(Utah 1982), the State blurs the distinction and treats these two 
mental states as if they were identical. 
The State claims in its petition that "even this Court 
could not completely accept its narrow reading of section 
76-4-101(2)" because in footnote 5, this Court points out that 
"Maestas is still good law insofar as it authorizes prosecution for 
attempted aggravated murder under the intentional or knowing 
formulation of 76-5-202(1) or attempted murder under the intentional 
or knowing formulation of section 76-5-203(1)(a)." State's petition 
for rehearing at 7-8; Vigil, slip op. at 8 n.5. 
Contrary to the State's assertion, retention of Maestas 
for that proposition can be reconciled with the holding in this 
case. The knowing mental state this Court referred to in footnote 5 
is the knowledge that the conduct will cause death, i.e. that death 
is the inevitable consequence of the actions. This mental state is 
the mental state involved in the situation where an actor detonates 
a bomb knowing the people in the building will die. As the MPC 
points out, the term "intent" is somewhat ambiguous and could 
encompass this situation where the actor knew that the persons would 
die as the inevitable consequence of his actions.3 
3. By including the mental state which requires knowledge that the 
conduct will cause death, this Court is arguably adopting the 
minority position that a crime of attempted "knowledge of death" 
homicide exists. To the extent that this Court is concerned about 
the inclusion of the "knowing" mental state of Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 76-5-202(1) and 76-5-203(1)(a) as one for which an attempt can 
occur, this Court could modify the opinion to delete that 
reference. Removing the reference to a knowing mental state would 
(continued) 
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The State's position that "intent" in § 76-4-101(2) is a 
"generic" term which encompasses all mental states is without 
support. At best, the State's reliance on the MPC and Black's Law 
Dictionary arguably demonstrates that "intent" includes the knowing 
mental state where death is the inevitable consequence of the 
actions and not circumstances where the actor knew he created a 
grave risk of death. Such an expansive reading of "intent" is not, 
however, supported by the remainder of the code, e.g., § 76-4-101(2) 
or prior decisions of this Court which discuss the attempt statute. 
The State's argument on rehearing fails to address the 
fact that case law from this Court demonstrates that Utah's attempt 
statute requires an intent to consummate the target offense. See 
State v. Harmon, 712 P.2d 291, 292 (Utah 1986); State v. Bell, 785 
P.2d 390 (Utah 1989); State v. Howell, 649 P.2d at 93-4; State v. 
Norman, 580 P.2d at 239. In order to embrace the State's position, 
this Court would be required to overrule existing case law in 
addition to ignoring the MPC and language of the statutes. 
Other courts which have addressed the issue of whether 
attempted depraved indifference murder exists have found that such a 
crime is a "logical impossibility" since it requires that the actor 
intend to commit an unintended killing. See State v. Johnson, 707 
(footnote 3 continued) 
ease the State's concerns and would defer the issue of whether an 
attempted "knowledge of death" homicide under § 76-5-202 or 
§ 76-5-203(1)(a) can be committed to a case where the issue is 
directly presented to the Court. 
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P.2d 1174, 1177 (N.M. App. 1985); Commonwealth v. Griffin. 310 Pa. 
Super- 39, 456 A.2d 171 (1983). 
This Court has issued an opinion which follows the 
language of the statutes, is consistent with existing case law, and 
offers a straightforward approach for prosecuting charges of 
attempted murder. The concept of depraved indifference is confusing 
at best in the situation where the conduct causes a death; this 
Court correctly refused to further complicate the area by outlining 
a crime of attempted depraved indifference which is not set forth in 
the statute. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant, WILFRED A. VIGIL, JR., respectfully requests 
that this Court deny the State's petition for rehearing, or, 
alternatively, revise the opinion in this case to require an intent 
to kill without reference to the "knowledge that the conduct will 
cause death" mental state. 
SUBMITTED this /? day of October, 1992. 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, JOAN C. WATT, hereby certify that I have caused ten 
copies of the foregoing to be delivered to the Utah Supreme Court, 
332 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, and four copies to 
the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84114, this 2_ day of October, 1992. 
<h-lcC»7y 
JOAN C. WATT 
DELIVERED/MAILED this day of October, 1992. 
- 11 -
ADDENDUM A 
This opinion is subject to revision before final 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
Wilfred A. Vigil, Jr., 
Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 900166 
F I L E D 
September 3, 1992 
Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable Raymond S. Uno 
Attorneys: R. Paul Van Dam, David B. Thompson, Salt Lake City, 
for plaintiff 
James C. Bradshaw, Joan C. Watt, Salt Lake City, for 
defendant 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: 
Wilfred A. Vigil, Jr., appeals from a trial court order 
denying a motion he directed against two counts of an information 
filed against him. He moved to amend one count of attempted 
second degree murder and to dismiss a second count of attempted 
second degree murder. The sole question presented on appeal is 
whether the trial court correctly ruled that Vigil could be 
prosecuted for attempted second degree murder under the depraved 
indifference alternative of section 76-5-203(1)(c) of the Code. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(1)(c) (1990) (amended 1991).1 We hold 
that Utah does not recognize attempted depraved indifference 
homicide and reverse the trial court order denying Vigils 
motion. 
Because the facts are unimportant to the issue before 
us, we will summarize them briefly. Vigil was charged with one 
count of second degree murder, a first degree felony, id. 
§ 76-5-203(1)-(2), and two counts of attempted second degree 
murder, a second degree felony, id. §§ 76-5-203(1), -4-101, 
1
 In 1991, the legislature changed "second degree murder" to 
simply "murder" and "first degree murder" to "aggravated murder." 
1991 Utah Laws ch. 10, §§ 7-9 (codified as amended Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 75-5-201 to -203 (Supp. 1992)). 
-4-102(2). These counts arose out of his allegedly shooting a 
rifle into a crowd on State Street in Salt Lake City. The 
shooting resulted in the death of one person and the wounding of 
two others. Before trial, Vigil moved to amend one count of the 
information and dismiss another. The aim of the motion was 
to delete from the information anything that would allow the jury 
to find him guilty of attempted depraved indifference homicide. 
The trial court denied the motion, whereupon Vigil petitioned 
this court for permission to make an interlocutory appeal. We 
granted his request and now consider the correctness of the trial 
court's ruling. 
We first state the standard of review. The question of 
whether Utah recognizes attempted depraved indifference homicide 
is purely a matter of statutory interpretation. Therefore, we 
review the trial court's ruling for correctness and give no 
deference to its conclusions. State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421, 
424 (Utah 1991); City of Monticello v. Christensen, 788 P.2d 513, 
516 (Utah), cert, denied. 111 S. Ct. 120 (1990); Provo City Corp. 
v. Willden, 768 P.2d 455, 456 (Utah 1989). 
The issue before us is narrow. We are asked to 
determine whether proof of the "knowing" mental state required 
for depraved indifference homicide under section 76-5-203(1)(c) 
of the Code is sufficient to satisfy the mental state required by 
Utah's attempt statute found in section 76-4-101. If we find 
that the "knowing" mental state required for depraved 
indifference homicide is sufficient to satisfy the attempt 
statute, the* State will be able to prosecute a defendant for 
attempt to commit depraved indifference homicide. 
We begin with the two statutes. The first is the 
second degree murder statute, which sets out several alternative 
formulations of second degree murder. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-203(1) (1990) (amended 1991). The formulation we are 
concerned with is subparagraph (1)(c), the depraved indifference 
formulation. Subparagraph (1) (c) , as construed by this court in 
State v. Standiford. 769 P.2d 254, 263-64 (Utah 1988), and State 
v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042, 1046-47 (Utah 1984), provides that a 
defendant may be convicted of second degree murder if he or she 
killed another with a "knowing" mental state, i.e., if the 
defendant knew his or her conduct created a grave risk of death 
to another.2 
2
 In Standiford, we held that to convict a defendant of 
depraved indifference homicide, the jury must find "(1) that the 
defendant acted knowingly (2) in creating a grave risk of death, 
(3) that the defendant knew the risk of death was grave, 
(4) which means a highly likely probability of death, and 
(5) that the conduct evidenced an utter callousness and 
indifference toward human life." 769 P.2d at 2 64. 
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The other statute of concern is the attempt statute, 
section 76-4-101. The mental state required by the attempt 
statute is found in the first two paragraphs, as indicated by 
emphasis below: 
(1) For purposes of this part a person 
is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, 
acting with the kind of culpability otherwise 
required for the commission of the offense, 
he [or she] engages in conduct constituting a 
substantial step toward commission of the 
offense. 
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct 
does not constitute a substantial step unless 
it is strongly corroborative of the actor/s 
intent to commit the offense. 
(3) No defense to the offense of 
attempt shall arise: 
(a) Because the offense attempted was 
actually committed; or 
(b) Due to factual or legal 
impossibility if the offense could have been 
committed had the attendant circumstances 
been as the actor believed them to be. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101 (emphasis added). 
To determine whether the legislature intended to 
recognize attempted depraved indifference homicide, we begin with 
the statutes' plain language. We will resort to other methods of 
statutory interpretation only if we find the language of the 
statutes to be ambiguous. See Shurtz v, BMW of N. Am., Inc., 814 
P.2d 1108, 1112 (Utah 1991); Bonham v. Morgan. 788 P.2d 497, 500 
(Utah 1989) (per curiam). 
Paragraph (1) of the attempt statute provides that an 
attempt can occur whenever the actor acts with the "kind of 
culpability otherwise required" for the completed crime and his 
or her act is a "substantial step" toward committing the crime. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101(1). Because the criminal code 
specifies four discrete mental states that may result in criminal 
liability, i.e., intent, knowledge, recklessness, or negligence, 
id. § 76-2-101(1), the language in paragraph (1) seems to suggest 
that an attempt conviction may be based upon the incomplete 
perpetration of any of the crimes in the Code. 
On the other hand, paragraph (2) of the attempt statute 
states that the defendant's conduct must be corroborative of his 
or her "intent to commit the offense." Id. § 76-4-101(2). At 
3 No. 900166 
first blush, this provision appears to contradict the broad 
"culpability" language in paragraph (1). While paragraph (1) 
seems to allow for any mental state so long as it falls within 
the "kind of culpability otherwise required" for the underlying 
offense, paragraph (2) seems to require a mental state of 
"intent." 
However, closer examination indicates that paragraphs 
(1) and (2) are not contradictory. "Culpability," the term used 
in paragraph (1), and "intent," the term used in paragraph (2), 
are distinct concepts. Intent is a mental state. Black's Law 
Dictionary 415 (5th abr. ed. 1983). Culpability, on the other 
hand, refers to blameworthiness, id. at 200; 25 C.J.S. 
Culpability (1966), a value society assigns to particular 
behaviors that it deems punishable. Culpability is an inclusive 
term that comprehends action or omissions, the mental state with 
which they are done, and the circumstances in which the acts or 
omissions take place. See Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, 
Jr., Criminal Law § 24 (1979) [hereinafter Criminal Law]. Thus, 
although culpability includes consideration of the actor's mental 
state, it is a much broader concept than intent. See 25 C.J.S. 
Culpable (1966) (defining culpability as "deserving punishment 
. . . or blame or censure," but noting that it does not 
necessarily connote "guilt," "malice," or "guilty purpose").3 
With this distinction in mind, we interpret paragraphs 
(1) and (2) of section 76-4-101. In doing so, we rely on two 
well-established rules of statutory construction. Cf. Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-1-106 (requiring terms to be construed according to 
their fair import). First, specific statutory provisions take 
precedence over general statutory provisions. E.g., Osuala v. 
Aetna Life & Casualty, 608 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah 1980). Second, 
statutory provisions should be construed to give full effect to 
all their terms. E.g., Shurtz, 814 P.2d at 1112. 
Applying these two rules to the attempt statute 
resolves the apparent contradiction between paragraphs (1) and 
(2). The more specific requirement of intent in paragraph (2) 
(i.e., "intent to commit the [underlying] offense") takes 
precedence over the general culpability requirement in paragraph 
(1) (i.e., "culpability otherwise required for the commission of 
the [underlying] offense"). And to give the fullest possible 
effect to the terms of paragraphs (1) and (2), we construe the 
culpability requirement in paragraph (1) to refer to the 
3
 We are aware that culpability is sometimes used inter-
changeably with mental state. However, we think that this usage 
is imprecise. 
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attendant circumstances, if any, of the underlying offense and 
construe the intent language in paragraph (2) to limit the 
attempt statute to offenses with a mental state of "intent," In 
other words, attempt can be found for uncompleted offenses that 
4
 "Attendant circumstances" are those circumstances that may 
be required to be present for criminal liability in addition to 
the requisite physical conduct, or actus reus, and the mens rea 
specified for the offense. See Criminal Law § 34, at 237, 
240-41. In general, mens rea means "guilty mind," that attribute 
which, along with physical conduct, was required for criminal 
liability under common law, see id. § 27, at 191-92, and is now 
required by statute except for strict liability offenses. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-101(1) ("[N]o person is guilty of an 
offense unless his [or her] conduct is prohibited by law and 
. . . [h]e [or she] acts intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, 
with criminal negligence, or with a mental state otherwise 
specified . . . . " ) . The mens rea is the mental state required 
in all homicide offenses for criminal liability. See id. 
§ 76-2-102 ("Every offense not involving strict liability shall 
require a culpable mental state . . . . " ) ; id. § 76-5-201 ("A 
person commits criminal homicide if he [or she] intentionally, 
knowingly, recklessly, with criminal negligence, or acting with a 
mental state otherwise specified in the statute defining the 
offense, causes the death of another human being, including an 
unborn child."). 
Occasionally, an offense may require a certain mental state 
for an attendant circumstance. For example, under section 
76-5-202(1) (k) of the current Code, a person is guilty of 
aggravated murder ("first degree murder" under the 1990 statute) 
if he or she intentionally or knowingly causes the death of a 
police officer acting in an official capacity and the person knew 
or "reasonably should have known" that the decedent was a police 
officer. Id. § 76-5-202(1)(k). The mens rea element for this 
offense is intent or knowledge, whereas the attendant 
circumstance that the decedent was a police officer requires at 
least a negligent mental state. Some offenses do not have 
attendant circumstances, such as the intentional or knowing 
formulation of murder ("second degree murder" under the 1990 
statute), which requires only conduct that intentionally or 
knowingly causes the death of another. Id. § 76-5-203(1)(a). 
Other offenses that do have attendant circumstances may not 
require a mental state for one or all of those circumstances. An 
example of the latter type of offense is the depraved 
indifference formulation of murder, which requires that the 
defendant act "under circumstances evidencing a depraved 
indifference to human life." Id. § 76-5-203(1)(c). The 
defendant's mental state under this provision is irrelevant to 
the determination of this attendant circumstance; it refers 
solely to objective circumstances. Fontana, 680 P.2d at 1045, 
1047. See generally Criminal Law § 27, at 194-95. 
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require "intent," even though those offenses have attendant 
circumstances that require lesser mental states. 
Our construction of Utah's attempt statute finds 
support in the attempt provisions of the Model Penal Code ("MPC") 
and the 1971 Proposed Federal Criminal Code ("PFCC"), both of 
which served as bases for the Utah provision. See State v. 
Pearson, 680 P.2d 406, 408 (Utah 1984) (per curiam) (noting that 
the Utah attempt statute was modeled after the MPC version); 
Loren Martin, Utah Criminal Code Outline 169 (1973) (noting that 
the Utah attempt statute was modeled after section 1001 of the 
PFCC); cf. 1 National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal 
Laws, Working Papers of the National Commission on Reform of 
Federal Criminal Laws 351-52 (1970) (relying on the stated 
purposes of the MPC attempt provision as the current penalogical 
thinking) [hereinafter National Commission Working Papers]. 
Both the MPC and PFCC provisions include two phrases 
regarding the requisite mental states for attempt that are the 
same as or analogous to the provisions of the Utah attempt 
statute• One phrase is the "kind of culpability otherwise 
required" that is also used in paragraph (1) of the Utah attempt 
statute. The other phrase specifies the mental state necessary 
for the conduct that constitutes the substantial step, which 
corresponds to the "intent" requirement in paragraph (2) of the 
Utah attempt statute. See Model Penal Code § 5.01(1), (2), 
reproduced in 1 Amer. L. Inst., Model Penal Code and Commentaries 
295-96 (1985) [hereinafter MPC Commentaries1; Proposed Federal 
Criminal Code § 1001(1), reproduced in 1 National Commission on 
Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, Final Report of the National 
Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws 6 (1971). The 
commentaries to the MPC and PFCC attempt provisions indicate that 
the clause requiring the "kind of culpability otherwise required" 
for commission of the offense refers to the attendant 
circumstances of the underlying offense and the requisite mental 
states for those circumstances. See MPC Commentaries § 5.01, at 
301, 303; National Commission Working Papers at 355. In 
contrast, the commentaries make clear that both the MPC and PFCC 
attempt provisions require a more culpable mental state than 
recklessness for conduct that creates the substantial step. The 
PFCC attempt provision requires intentional conduct, National 
Commission Working Papers at 354 & n.6, and the MPC attempt 
provision requires either intentional conduct or the belief that 
the actor's conduct will result in the proscribed act. MPC 
Commentaries § 5.01, at 303. 
Despite the foregoing support for limiting the Utah 
attempt provision to offenses requiring intent, the State argues 
that we should define "intent" in paragraph (2) of the attempt 
statute broadly to include purposeful intent and "equivalent" 
mental states, specifically, that required for depraved 
indifference homicide. The State reasons that this makes sense 
from a policy standpoint because the culpability of a person 
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convicted of depraved indifference second degree murder is the 
same as the culpability of a person convicted of intentional 
second degree murder. See Standiford, 769 P.2d at 258; Fontana, 
680 P.2d at 1045. In short, the State argues that the degree of 
the murder (i.e., "first" or "second") is a measure of the 
societal judgment about the criminal's culpability and therefore 
murders of equal degree should be treated similarly. 
Notwithstanding the apparent logic of this argument, 
the State's suggested interpretation of "intent" in paragraph (2) 
of the attempt statute is contrary to the definition given to it 
by the legislature. Section 76-2-103(1) of the Code states that 
a person engages in conduct intentionally "with respect to the 
nature of his [or her] conduct or to the result of his [or her] 
conduct, when it is his [or her] conscious objective or desire to 
engage in the conduct or cause the result•" Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-2-103(1) (emphasis added). Normally, we presume that when 
the legislature defines a term of art and later uses that term in 
the same body of statutes, it intends a consistent meaning. 
E.g., Cannon v. McDonald. 615 P.2d 1268, 1270 (Utah 1980). 
Accordingly, the word "intent" as used in paragraph (2) of the 
attempt statute should be read to mean "conscious objective or 
desire." This meaning of the word "intent" obviously is 
distinguishable from knowledge of the proscribed conduct or 
result, which is the mental state required for depraved 
indifference homicide. 
Moreover, the State's position is inconsistent with our 
prior decisions. In State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390 (Utah 1989), we 
addressed the question of whether there could be attempted 
felony-murder under subparagraph (d) of the second degree murder 
statute. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(1) (d) (Supp. 1989) (amended 
1991). We said no, reasoning that "[t]he crime of attempted 
murder does not fit within the felony-murder doctrine because an 
attempt to commit a crime requires proof of an intent to 
consummate the crime . . . ." 785 P.2d at 393 (emphasis added). 
In two other cases, we considered attempt in the 
context of Utah's manslaughter statute, which sets out three 
alternative formulations of manslaughter. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-205. Under this statute, manslaughter may arise where the 
actor (i) recklessly causes death, id. § 76-5-205(1)(a), 
(ii) causes death under the influence of extreme emotional 
disturbance, id. § 76-5-205(1)(b), or (iii) causes death under 
circumstances where the actor reasonably believes that his or her 
conduct is legally justifiable. Id. § 76-5-205(1)(c). 
In State v. Norman, 580 P.2d 237 (Utah 1978), we 
addressed the first two formulations. We held that an attempt 
cannot be charged where the attempted crime is the form of 
manslaughter described in subparagraph (a) of the statute because 
that formulation requires only the mental state of recklessness, 
whereas "[a]n attempt to commit a crime is an act done with the 
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intent to commit that crime . . . ." Id. at 239 (emphasis 
added). Regarding subparagraph (b), we held that attempted 
manslaughter is possible under this formulation because "the 
killing may be intentional but due to mental or emotional 
disturbance on the part of the defendant." Id. at 240 (emphasis 
added). 
We addressed the third formulation in State v. Howell. 
649 P.2d 91 (Utah 1982). There we held that attempted 
manslaughter can be charged for a crime described under 
subparagraph (c) of the manslaughter statute because the killing 
proscribed under that provision must be "intentional." Id. at 94 
(emphasis added). We again noted that "one cannot be guilty of 
an attempt to commit a crime unless the necessary mens rea of the 
completed crime is intentional conduct." Id. at 94 n.l (emphasis 
added).5 
At bottom, the State seeks to replace the word "intent" 
in paragraph (2) of the attempt statute with, as it says, "intent 
or a mental state that is equivalent thereto" and to modify or 
reject the holdings of Bell, Norman, and Howell. Although it may 
make sense to allow attempt for homicide offenses that are 
presumably equal in culpability to intentional murder, we believe 
that the most reasonable approach, in light of the statutory 
language and our cases, is to read the word "intent" in 
paragraph (2) of the attempt statute as that word is defined in 
section 76-2-103(1). 
5
 In State v. Maestas, 652 P.2d 903 (1982), we rejected an 
argument that the Utah attempt statute required a higher level of 
"intent" than that required for first degree murder. In so 
holding, we interpreted paragraph (1) of the Utah attempt statute 
as making "clear that regardless of any requirements which the 
common law may impose concerning *attempt' crimes, Utah law 
requires only *the kind of culpability otherwise required for the 
commission of the [completed] offense.'" Id. at 904 (brackets in 
original) (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101(1) (1953)). 
Alternatively, we wrote that even if the Utah attempt statute 
incorporated the common law requirement of intent, the mental 
state required for first degree murder was sufficient to meet 
that requirement. Id. at 905. 
The first alternative rationale relied on in Maestas is 
clearly inconsistent with our cases in Bell, Howell, and Norman 
and with our holding in the instant case. Thus, that portion of 
Maestas that conflicts with these cases and todays holding is 
incorrect. However, we note that Maestas is still good law 
insofar as it authorizes prosecution for attempted aggravated 
murder under the intentional or knowing formulation of section 
76-5-202(1) or attempted murder under the intentional or knowing 
formulation of section 76-5-203(1)(a). 
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Clarity is crucial to a just criminal law system. 
Jurors are instructed to apply the language set forth in our 
penal statutes to determine criminal liability. Articulating the 
various mental states required for the various crimes in the Code 
is difficult enough without giving multiple meanings to the word 
"intent." 
We hold that to convict a defendant of attempted second 
degree murder, the prosecution must prove that the defendant had 
a conscious objective or desire to cause the death of another. 
Because the mental state required for depraved indifference 
homicide falls short of that intent, the crime of attempted 
depraved indifference homicide does not exist in Utah. 
The order of the trial court denying Vigil's motion to 
dismiss and amend is reversed. 
WE CONCUR: 
Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice 
Richard C. Howe, Associate 
Chief Justice 
I. Daniel Stewart, Justice 
Christine M. Durham, Justice 
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INTRODUCTION 
Mr. Vigil refers this Court to his opening brief for the 
statements of jurisdiction, the issue, standard of review, the 
facts, and the case. Appellant's opening brief at 1-3. The actual 
facts alleged by the State are not necessary for this Court to 
resolve the legal issue presented in this interlocutory appeal. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Model Penal Code, Utah case law, and case law from 
other jurisdictions support Mr. Vigil's argument that attempted 
depraved indifference homicide does not constitute an offense. An 
actual intent to kill—not a mental state of equivalent 
culpability—is required for an attempted murder. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT. CASE LAW AND THE MODEL PENAL CODE SUPPORT 
MR. VIGILS ARGUMENT THAT ATTEMPTED DEPRAVED 
INDIFFERENCE HOMICIDE DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN 
OFFENSE. 
The State argues that "Utah's attempt statute, section 
76-4-101, is derived from the Model Penal Code," and that a comment 
to Model Penal Code, art. 5, § 501 (1985) ("M.P.C.") suggests that 
attempted depraved indifference murder is a viable crime in Utah. 
See State's brief at 8-10. In making such an argument, the State 
misreads the portion of the comment which it quotes on pages 8-9 of 
its brief and fails to read the comment as a whole. 
In State v. Pearson, 680 P.2d 406, 408 (Utah 1984) 
(per curiam), this Court stated: 
The statute adopts the definition of an "attempt" 
employed in the Model Penal Code, §5.01, purposed 
on drawing the line further away from the final 
act and enlarging the common law concept. 
While Utah's statute adopts the M.P.C. definition of 
attempt, the statute is not a verbatim replica of the M.P.C. M.P.C. 
§ 5.01(1) states: 
Section 5.01. Criminal Attempt 
(1) Definition of Attempt. A person is 
guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, acting 
with the kind of culpability otherwise required 
for commission of the crime, he: 
(a) purposely engages in conduct that 
would constitute the crime if the attendant 
circumstances were as he believes them to 
be; or 
(b) when causing a particular result is 
an element of the crime, does or omits to do 
anything with the purpose of causing or with 
the belief that it will cause such result 
without further conduct on his part; or 
(c) purposely does or omits to do 
anything that, under the circumstances as he 
believes them to be, is an act or omission 
constituting a substantial step in a course 
of conduct planned to culminate in his 
commission of the crime. 
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By contrast, Utah's attempt statute, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-4-101 (1990), states in pertinent part: 
(1) For purposes of this part a person is guilty 
of an attempt to commit a crime if, acting with 
the kind of culpability otherwise required for 
the commission of the offense, he engages in 
conduct constituting a substantial step toward 
commission of the offense. 
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct does not 
constitute a substantial step unless it is 
strongly corroborative of the actor's intent to 
commit the offense. 
The portion of the comment to M.P.C. § 5.01 quoted by the 
State on pages 8-9 of its brief refers specifically to subsection 
1(b) of M.P.C. § 5.01. The language in subsection 1(b) was not 
adopted by this state. 
Subsection 1(b) deals with situations where the actor has 
the purpose of causing a specific result or the belief that his 
conduct will cause a specific result; in a depraved indifference 
situation, the actor merely knows that his conduct creates a grave 
risk of death, not that it will cause a death.1 
Furthermore, the portion of the comment quoted by the State 
refers to a factual scenario which does not constitute depraved 
indifference. The comment states that: 
[A]n actor commits an attempt when he does or 
omits to do anything with the purpose of causing 
"or with the belief that it will cause" such 
result without further conduct on his part. 
1. In a situation where the actor knows his conduct will cause a 
death, a charge under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(1)(a) rather than 
§ 76-5-203(1)(c) is appropriate. 
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Thus, a belief that death will ensue from the 
actor's conduct . . . will suffice, as well as 
would a purpose to bring about the results. 
(emphasis added). M.P.C, art. 5, § 501. 
The example quoted by the State involves a situation where 
the actor knows that death will result as the "inevitable 
consequence" of the actor's conduct. The comment points out that 
"the concept of 'intent' has always been an ambiguous one and might 
be thought to include results that the actor believed to be the 
inevitable consequence of his conduct." Id. at 305. In other 
words, under the circumstances outlined in the quote on pages 8-9 of 
the State's brief, the actor may well have "intended" the death; 
this is distinct from depraved indifference which requires only a 
knowledge by the actor that he or she has created a grave risk of 
death. See State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1984). 
In addition, as the State acknowledges on page 9 of its 
brief,"[o]nly a minority of recent revisions have explicitly 
followed the Model Penal Code on this point" (citing M.P.C. at 305). 
Finally, in relying on the quoted passage, the State fails 
to consider the remainder of the same comment. Immediately prior to 
the quoted passage, the comment points out that where an actor 
engages in conduct which recklessly or negligently creates a risk of 
death, "[t]he approach of the Model Penal Code is not to treat such 
behavior as an attempt." Id. at 304. 
More importantly, immediately following the passage quoted 
by the State, the comment states: 
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Since a particular crime must actually be 
intended, the charge must be precise and must not 
permit the jury to convict the actor on one of 
several mental states. Thus when the charge is 
attempted murder or assault with intent to kill, 
it is error to permit conviction on a finding of 
reckless disregard for human life (footnote 
omitted) or intent to inflict grievous bodily 
harm (footnote omitted). And since a conviction 
for murder can be premised on either of these 
mental states - as well as on intent to kill - it 
is improper to say that one can be convicted of 
attempted murder if he could have been convicted 
of murder had the victim died. There must be a 
specific intent to kill. 
Id. at 306-7 (emphasis added). This passage not only clarifies that 
intent to kill is required for an attempted murder charge under the 
Model Penal Code, it also refutes the broad policy argument made by 
the State in closing. See State's brief at 13. 
The State also argues that in State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390 
(Utah 1989), this Court really meant to say that attempted murder 
"requires an intent to kill or a mental state equivalent thereto" 
(State's brief at 8). Such a position ignores the clear language of 
Bell, the rationale behind the Bell decision, and the rationale of 
the decisions explicitly relied on by this Court in reaching its 
decision in Bell. 
As Mr. Vigil pointed out in his opening brief at 7-8, in 
Bell, this Court stated that to be guilty of an attempt, one must 
intend to consummate the crime and that to be guilty of an attempted 
murder, one must intend to kill. Appellant's opening brief at 7-8; 
Bell, 785 P.2d at 394. Nothing in Bell supports the State's 
assertion that this Court meant to include mental states which are 
equivalent to intent to kill; although the State claims that in 
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Bell, this "Court emphasized that felony murder, insofar as the 
homicide is concerned, does not require proof of any culpable mental 
state" (State's brief at 7), no such emphasis occurs in Bell, 
Instead, this Court emphasized the requirement that one intend to 
kill in order to be guilty of an attempted murder. Bell, 785 P.2d 
at 393-4.2 
The cases relied upon by this Court in reaching its 
decision in Bell also refute the State's argument that a specific 
intent to kill is not required for attempted murder. See Bell, 785 
P.2d at 393. State v. Huff, 469 A.2d 1251 (Me. 1984), does not 
involve felony-murder; instead, the Huff court discussed the 
"logical impossibility" of attempted murder based on a "knowing" 
mental state. 469 A.2d at 1253. 
The State attempts to distinguish Huff by arguing that the 
Maine statute has an additional sentence which requires the "intent 
to complete the commission of the crime." State's brief at 10, 
footnote 7. However, the State acknowledges the argument that the 
"extra" sentence in the Maine statute is "essentially the same as 
[the language] which appears in subsection (2) of section 
76-4-101." State's brief at 10. Case law from this Court 
demonstrates that Utah's attempt statute requires an intent to 
consummate the target offense. See State v. Harmon, 612 P.2d 291, 
292 (Utah 1986). In addition, this Court has already decided that 
2. In at least five places in the Bell decision, this Court 
mentioned the necessity of the actor having an intent to kill in 
order to be convicted of attempted murder. 785 P.2d at 393-4. 
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Maine's attempt statute is similar to Utah's attempt statute. Bell, 
785 P.2d at 393. Hence, the State's attempts to distinguish this 
Court's reliance on Huff are not convincing. 
Furthermore, the State does not even attempt to distinguish 
the cases cited by this Court for the proposition that "numerous 
courts have held that the crime of attempted murder requires a 
specific intent to kill." Bell, 785 P.2d at 393, footnote 13. For 
example, in People v. Mitchell. 424 N.E.2d 658, 661 (111. App. 
1981), the court stated: 
The offense of attempt (murder) requires the 
mental state of specific intent to commit 
murder. Knowledge that the consequences of an 
act may result in death or grave bodily injury, 
or intent to do bodily harm is not enough, 
[citation omitted] 
In State v. Standiford. 769 P.2d 254, 259 (Utah 1988), this 
Court made the following statement: 
These terms [the four culpable mental states 
listed in the second degree murder statute] are 
comparable to the old malice aforethought, but 
are much more precise and less confusing. The 
statute treats these forms of homicides as having 
similar culpability. Second degree murder is 
based on a very high degree of moral 
culpability. That culpability arises either from 
an actual intent to kill or from a mental state 
that is essentially equivalent thereto—such as 
intending grievous bodily injury and knowingly 
creating a very high risk of death. The risk of 
death in the latter two circumstances must be so 
great as to evidence such an indifference to life 
as to be tantamount to that evidenced by an 
intent to kill. In contrast, the felony-murder 
provision of the second degree murder statute is 
something of an exception to the above principle, 
as it does not require an intent to kill or any 
other similar mental state. 
The State latches onto the last sentence quoted above, and 
argues that because felony-murder does not involve a mental state 
similar to that of intent to kill, the rationale of Bell is not 
applicable to attempted depraved murder. Regardless of whether 
felony-murder involves a level of culpability similar to that of 
intent to kill, the repeated references in Bell to the necessity of 
an intent to kill in order to be convicted of attempted murder are 
applicable in the depraved indifference context; in Bell, this Court 
did not base its decision on the idea that one who commits a 
felony-murder has a lesser degree of culpability than one who is 
charged with attempted depraved indifference. Instead, it based its 
decision on the lack of intent to kill. See discussion supra at 6. 
In addition, the meaning of the quoted Standiford paragraph 
is not clear. At the outset of the paragraph, this Court pointed 
out that the statute treats the various forms of second degree 
murder as having similar culpability and that a high degree of 
culpability is required for second degree murder. An individual who 
intentionally commits one of the serious felonies specified in 
§ 76-5-203(1)(d) resulting in a death certainly has a level of 
culpability on par with one who knowingly creates a risk of death. 
The dictum in the last sentence should not be used as a basis for 
backtracking on this Court's straightforward message in Bell, 
State v. Norman, 580 P.2d 237 (Utah 1978), and State v. Howell, 649 
P.2d 91 (Utah 1982), that an intent to kill is required in order to 
be convicted of attempted homicide. (See Appellant's opening brief 
at 8.) 
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The majority of cases addressing the issue have determined 
that an intent to kill is necessary in order to convict for 
attempted murder. See State v. Bell, 785 P.2d at 393-4 (and cases 
cited therein). Courts which have addressed the issue of whether 
depraved indifference murder exists have found that such a crime is 
a "logical impossibility" since it requires that the actor intend to 
commit an unintended killing. See State v. Johnson, 707 P.2d 1174, 
1177 (N.M. App. 1985); Commonwealth v. Griffin, 310 Pa. Super. 39, 
456 A.2d 171 (1983). 
The only case cited by the State in support of its argument 
that some states have held that the crime of attempted depraved 
indifference murder exists is People v. Castro, 657 P.2d 932 (Colo. 
1983). See State's brief at 11. However, the decision in Castro is 
based on the court's belief that the defendant's argument was 
"constructed on a faulty premise, namely, that the crime of extreme 
indifference murder entails an unintentional and inchoate act." 
Castro, 657 P.2d at 937. The Castro court discussed at length the 
requirement under the Colorado extreme indifference statute that the 
defendant intentionally engage in conduct that created a grave risk 
of death to another, and based its decision on this intent 
requirement. Hence, Castro is distinguishable since no intent 
requirement exists under the Utah depraved indifference statute. 
Furthermore, the reasoning of the Castro court is not convincing. 
Although Mr. Vigil acknowledges that this Court has held 
that depraved indifference is a mental state which is equivalent in 
moral culpability to a specific intent to kill (see Appellant's 
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opening brief at 6), it does not require an actual intent to kill. 
Attempted depraved indifference is therefore a legal impossibility. 
The State acknowledges that Mr. Vigils argument is 
straightforward; Mr. Vigil's argument is supported by the language 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101, case law from this Court, the Model 
Penal Code, and the majority of case law from other jurisdictions. 
Mr. Vigil respectfully requests that this Court follow its decisions 
in Norman, Howell and Bell and require an intent to kill—not a 
mental state of equivalent culpability—in order to be guilty of 
attempted murder. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Vigil respectfully requests that this Court reverse the 
order of the trial court, grant his Motion to Dismiss and Amend, and 
remand the case to the trial court with an order that Count III of 
the Information be dismissed and Count II be amended so as to delete 
the allegation that Mr. Vigil committed an attempted depraved 
indifference homicide. 
SUBMITTED this 154&. day of May, 1991. 
<^cm^ 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
JAMES C. BRADSHAW 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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